The practice-based view that currently dominates the routines literature is based on an ostensiveperformative duality. However, from the perspective of process philosophy, this duality, or at least the manner in which it is applied, presents four key obstacles to a more processual theorization of routines. This chapter offers an alternative approach that builds on Pragmatist philosophy, especially the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, which inform a performative rather than a representational approach to understanding ordinary everyday actions. The argument provides an account of the social and temporal situatedness of human conduct in terms of the inter-related processes of habit, inquiry, and conversational trans-actions.
C C T reputation for excellence is grounded in its strict adherence to the principles of Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just in Time (JIT) production. Some years ago, the Board sough
These events were experienced by one of us (Philippe) some 20 years ago, while he was working as a management controller at CompCo. He was fully engaged as a participant in this episode, contributing to the analysis and feedback processes that ensued. Over the following five years, he continued to discuss the episode with others who had been involved in this situation, then later he extended his exploration with academic colleagues. To us, it is a story that invites questions about often invisible and taken-for-granted assumptions regarding 4 human action at the human-machine interface, and in particular about the situated actions that emerge through social interactions. There is an element of unanticipated human intervention that must be unraveled if lessons are to be learned from the CompCo experience.
How are we to understand what happens when well-planned actions fall apart, and how should we theorize the improvisational actions that inevitably arise in such situations (Suchman, 1987) ?
Routines theory has potential to open up some useful insights into the CompCo story. For instance, it might seek to understand how production routines changed while at the same time persisting throughout the introduction of the new CIM system (Howard-Grenville, 2005 ).
It might demonstrate how patterns of action were varied, retained and selected in the evolution of production routines (Pentland et al., 2012) . Or it might map the learning processes that accompany this evolving process (Rerup and Feldman, 2011) . More generally, a practice-based theorization of routines (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003) may be maintaining, disrupting, and changing routines, where these are understood (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 95) . This definition not only recognizes human agency in the performation of routines, but it also acknowledges the relationality of social (and material) interactions. What is missing though, is a thorough-going theorization of the temporal dimensions of those situated actions that comprise routines. This is precisely where process theory might very productively intersect with contemporary understandings of routines.
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In this chapter, we pursue this opportunity for theory development firstly by investigating the ontological and epistemological status of routines in organizing processes. Analyzing the limits of routines theory, both in its historical behaviorist form (March and Simon, 1993) and in its later practice-based form (Feldman and Pentland, 2003) , we uncover four obstacles to a more processual appreciation of human conduct. Next, we propose an alternative theorization inspired by Pragmatist thinking about human action as a continuously emerging social process of meaning-making. Taking human conduct as the motive force for social change, the Pragmatists developed a practical and fundamentally processual understanding of those movements that shape, and are shaped by our everyday experiences of living. We focus particularly on the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, both of whom are already known to the routines community (Cohen, 2007; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013; Winter, 2013) , but here we go further by exploring three specific dimensions (habit, inquiry, and conversational trans-action) in their Pragmatist theory of creative action (Joas, 1996) . As we unfold each of these dimensions, we will return to CompCo to illustrate and deepen our practical understandings of the situation. We argue that these three dimensions, taken in combination, offer fresh insights into the relational and temporal dynamics of routines.
A processual critique of routines theory
Scholarly interest in routines as mechanisms for the accomplishment of organizational work has been growing steadily for the past three decades (Becker, 2004; Parmigiani and HowardGrenville, 2011) This stimulus-response model is underpinned by a representational theory of mind. That is, it assumes the classic Cartesian separation of mind and body, which understands thinking as a way of forming cognitive representations of the experienced world, and acting as the execution of already formed representations. This dualistic formulation is, however, a serious point of contention for process theorists, who see it as cutting across the very processes that are of interest, reducing movement to static representations, and thereby failing to account for the relational and temporal dynamics of practical organizational situations (Simpson, 2009 ). As far back as 1896, Dewey was arguing that the only way to overcome dualisms such as stimulus-response is by not starting from disjointed parts (i.e. stimuli, processing, responses), but by asking how these parts hang together. In his view, it is not that the stimulus sets the organism in motion, but rather the organism, as long as it is alive, is always already 7 in motion. Living means moving. Stimulus and response are then each understood as complete acts that are mutually constituting in the processes of living rather than being related in a strictly causal sequence (Burbules, 2004) . This re-conceptualization of stimulus and response as an ongoing and dynamic interplay requires an ontological shift away from the substantialist assumptions of a representational idiom, towards the processual assumptions of a performative idiom (Pickering, 1995) , which emphasizes way-finding rather than navigation (Chia and Holt, 2009; Suchman, 1987) , and novelty emergence rather than predictability of outcomes (Garud et al., 2015) .
Perhaps anticipating this critique, March and Simon stressed the subjective and social nature which, far from being a purely physiological reflex, they saw as
psychological theories, a stimulus is a mere perceptual phenomenon but, giving the example of customer order management, March and Simon stretched this concept into a much thicker and more complex idea that comes close to the notion of a constructed narrative. Responding to these definitional issues, Feldman and Pentland (2003) (1986: 273) . Whilst either definition might be adopted to study power, like oil and water, the ostensive and performative cannot be blended together.
Drawing these threads of critique together, we see four key obstacles to a more processual theorization of routines:
Obstacle 1 Duality or dualism?
Dualisms are a recognized problem for those theories of action that seek to account for the mutually constituting dynamics of human conduct (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984; Joas, 1996) . A dualism separates systems of action into discrete entities, each of which is defined in opposition to the other, each therefore being immanent in the other (e.g. mind is that aspect of human experience that is not body, and vice versa). There is thus an underlying commonality (the system of action itself) that allows opposing aspects to be unified in an inclusive theory, but one that necessarily lacks dynamism because it is built out of stable entitative units. Both Giddens and Bourdieu rejected dualistic accounts in favor of the numerical L performative definitions, is based on two alternative ways of being in, and knowing about the world. The social worlds in which we live are, of course, whole and continuous; they appear 9 to have dual, or plural, natures only because of the limitations of our theoretical (and philosophical) assumptions (Dewey, 1917) . There is no possibility of unifying these different natures, at least not at the same level of experience as that which created the duality.
Nevertheless, the alternative positions are useful to the extent that they offer radically different insights into human action. part is necessary, but neither part alone is sufficient to explain (or even describe) the properties of the phenomenon we refer to as organizational routines (2003: 95) . This seems to suggest a slippage towards the sort of dualistic thinking that would admit both terms, ostensive and performative, as qualifiers of the same underlying concept, namely routines.
Latour is very clear that in his view, ostensive theories of society have run their course, so (Latour, 1986: 272). He does not suggest that this approach can be bolted on to existing, representational notions of practice. His advice would seem to be that more effort is required to better theorize the performative view.
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Obstacle 2 A variance-based theory of learning and organizing A further implication of dualistic thinking is that it tends to suggest a causal connection between the ostensive and performative aspects of routines such that the performative generates new ideas that transform the ostensive, while implications of the ostensive encourage modifications in actual performances (Feldman, 2000) . This leads to routines being conceived as dual learning systems that engage both ostensive and performative aspects (see Figure 1 ). The resulting scheme of learning and organizing is variance-based: it is the perceived gap between the ostensive and the performative that motivates ongoing change. Following this logic, a good fit between ostensive and performative aspects would generate a high level of stability, or even resistance A close match seems likely to indicate and predict stability and perhaps inertia.
M (Pentland and Feldman, 2005: 805) . Langley (1999) critically contrasted variance-based theories with process theories, arguing that the former are concerned with explaining efficient causal relationships between discrete variables amongst which time ordering is immaterial to the outcomes (Mohr, 1982) , while the latter are more appropriate for mapping the probabilistic patterns of time-ordered events. Whereas variance-based theories provide a perspective on planned actions over time, process theories seek to engage in a continuous rethinking and adaptation of action in time. We argue it is this processual perspective that needs to be further developed within the routines literature.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
11
Obstacle 3 The temporal A (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 94) , the literature remains largely mute about their timing and temporality. We can, however, infer a strong logical (cause-effect) and temporal (sequential) link between the ostensive and performative aspects of routines. The ostensive refers to cognitive representations expressed as artefacts such as plans and operating procedures, while the performative is concerned with situated action (Suchman, 1987) . The ostensive is assumed to shape and direct performation ( T open and that must remain open for the (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 101) .
Whilst representationalism may be a useful fiction to analyze simple situations, it does not work in complex situations (Maturana and Varela, 1992) . A more processual approach would situate action in the ongoing and entangled constructions that develop within thinking by/in doing, and doing by/in thinking. There can still be representations, but they do not have the same status as in cognitivist theories. They are just iconic mediations that serve as resources for situated action, but not the (determining) source of that action. As stressed by Weick (1998: 553) , " [t] he process that animates these artifacts (structure, control, authority, planning, charters, and standard operating procedures) may well consist of ongoing efforts to rework and reenact them in relation to unanticipated ideas and conditions encountered in the moment". Thus performation, situated in the present moment and circumstances, has an 12 emergent and improvisational quality that is often "tacit, taken-for-granted" but nevertheless "part of the infrastructure present in all organizing" (Weick, 1998: 553) . The future then appears to actors as an open horizon of possibilities to explore, while the past is a rich, diverse and often contradictory source of inspiration. We suggest, therefore, that routines theory would benefit from the explicit inclusion of more processual understandings of time and temporality.
Obstacle 4 The micro-macro problem
The micro-macro dualism is pervasive and well-recognized as a problem in the social sciences. The issue is, once a system has been separated into discrete levels of analysis, how is it then possible to reassemble the dynamic relationships between these levels? Routines Their concern is how these processes emerge through practical engagements within concrete situations.
Pragmatism:
A processual approach to human social experience P D ion that, in order to find absolute and universal truths, everything should be subjected to doubt. Charles Sanders Peirce, who is often cited as the father of Pragmatism, rejected the primacy that this
Cartesian view affords the individual doubting thinker, isolated from the material and social world. Instead, he anchored his understanding of doubt in the local situated actions of ordinary day-to-day living, through which we discover together practical ways of coping with (Locke et al., 2008) . Doubt arises when our actions meet with some form of resistance, and it may be resolved by reconstructing the meanings of either the self or the situation, or rather their relationship. This reconstructive activity, which Peirce called Inquiry, is a creative accomplishment that continuously injects the possibilities of novelty and change into the otherwise recurring patterns of social experience (Joas, 1996) . The ontological category that underpins this Pragmatist position is process. That is, Pragmatists are more concerned with flow, movement, and the passage of events in time than with variables such as cognitive representations, objects, or the stuff of life more generally. Epistemologically their knowing is accomplished through relational engagement in conversations that transcend the usual dualisms permeating the organizational literature (e.g. stimulusresponse, subject-object, individual-organizational). Furthermore, Pragmatism invites 14 methodological innovation as researchers seek to go with the flow, themselves transforming as their research situations unfold.
Of course it is not possible to articulate the whole of the Pragmatist canon in this short chapter. Instead we will focus on three interrelated Pragmatist concepts, habit, inquiry, and conversational trans-action, which we find particularly useful in our re-viewing of routines theory. Although we will now elaborate each of these concepts in turn, in a performative idiom they are intimately engaged together in the unfolding of experience and should not be considered as separate in practice, where habits are continuously involved in lived experience as a resource and mediation of ongoing inquiry, which is achieved collectively through conversational trans-action.
Habit
Within the routines literature, and organization studies more generally, the notion of habit is often presented as an idiosyncratic and purely individual mode of conduct (Hodgson, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 1982) that is contrasted to routines, which are taken to be organizationlevel phenomena. For instance, Becker (1992: 328) defines habit in terms of mechanical behavior the focus is very much on the micro-level. Such habits are stimulus-response reflexes that (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 97) . Pragmatists, however, see habit as much more than a mere tool in efficient and rational decision-making.
For them, the defining quality of habit is its dispositional, rather than behavioral, orientation.
T (Dewey, 1922 (Dewey, [1957 : 32) I (Mead, 15 1938: 3) W when and how (Peirce, 1878: 257) .
This dispositional understanding of habit continues to be valued by contemporary writers such as Bourdieu, Elias, and Deleuze (Crossley, 2013) .
Dewey put particular effort into re-defining habit as a Pragmatist concept. For him, habits are acquired and continuously modified through experience, but they never fully determine the course of action. They are simultaneously object, resource and outcome of inquiries that are both situated and recursive. A habit is neither a representation of actual action nor the actual performance of an action, but rather it is an acquired resource that mediates between the particular action situation and its organizational, social and temporal contexts. To be precise, it is an inherently social, lively and mutable (Cohen, 2007) The TQM habit engaged by the operator arises as he imagines the potential future situation of a machine jammed by the broken tray (temporal context) and seeks to avoid difficulties for downstream operators (social context). The habit also transforms the primary meaning and definition of apparently simple objects, such as plastic trays, which prove much more complex and polysemous than at first glance. Should the plastic tray be considered a physical object characterized as broken or not broken, or is it rather an informational object that conveys vital systems information in the form of a bar-code? How this question is answered completely changes the way actors look at and engage with the object.
Habits translate diffusely teleological social motives into immediate actions. They translate
we must begin to work backward in thought. We must change what is to be done into a how, T chief importance is the one nearest the present state of the one acting ... Now the thing which is closest to us, the means within our power, is a habit" (Dewey 1922 (Dewey /2002 ordinary production incident? The intelligence of the situation must be built continuously; it is not an automatic, Pavlovian reflex Bentley, 1949/2008) . Habit transforms a singular act performed here and now into a socially meaningful gesture. Therefore, crucially, habit involves ongoing judgment so it cannot be equivalent to mindless repetition. "We must repetition. It assumes from the start the identity of habit with routine. Repetition is in no sense the essence of habit. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of many habits but not of all. The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts" (Dewey, 1922 (Dewey, [1957 : 41-42).
Inquiry

I P (Lorino et al., 2011). It is an evolving
and transformational process in which selves and situations are mutually engaged and always in-the-making (Elkjaer and Simpson, 2011) . Dewey (1938 Dewey ( /1986 ) defined inquiry very specifically as the process that transforms an indeterminate, or doubtful situation into one that is sufficiently unified that a coherent course of action can be anticipated. However, inquiry is not necessarily visible and neither does it always involve a perceptible rupture in habits.
"Some forms of common sense inquiries, which aim at determining what is to be done in some practical predicament, are neither exceptional nor infrequent. For the stock and staple of common sense inquiries and judgments are of this sort. to inquire what is better to do next." (Dewey, 1938 (Dewey, /1986 . Dewey, 1922 Dewey, [1957 : 70). Human action involves both habit and inquiry: habit-based inquiries develop inquiry-based habits, and vice versa. Retrospectively the process of action may appear as the implementation of some pre-determined plan, but in the present the possibilities for action are manifold, the future is open, and even when uncertainty seems very low, options for action are still contingent. Inquiry does not start from a structured problem that needs solving. Rather, the first critical phase of inquiry entails the tr There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive.
The CompCo story illustrates two distinct inquiry processes in relation to
The first result of evocation of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged, to be without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are (Dewey, 1938 (Dewey, /1986 , what actors are involved as inquirers and which are left out, and the temporal and spatial scope of the inquiry (Lorino and Tricard, 2012) .
At CompCo the indeterminate situation first has no intellectual status, it is just an existential unease: a broken tray on the production line; the assembly line stops working. The first phase of the inquiry, often tacit and rarely verbalized, transforms this existential unease into a structured problem: the broken tray needs to be fixed or replaced, and the bug that stopped the system must be traced.
Once a problem has been constructed, its resolution is sought by engaging abductive, deductive and inductive logics of reasoning (Lorino et al., 2011) . Firstly, a plausible hypothesis accounting for the problematic situation is abductively inferred in order to restore intelligibility. Then the hypothesis is translated into empirically testable propositions through 22 deductive reasoning. Finally, induction develops an empirical protocol to test the propositions (Peirce, 1998: 441-442) . The entire reasoning of inquiry is expressed through active experimentation in which thinking and acting are simultaneous and confluent dynamics. Of course the inquiry steps described here in a sequential way for the purposes of presentation, are inevitably iterative and entangled as they grope for new forms of understanding. The purpose of inquiries and their associated habits is to make sensible the present situation so that practical actions may be discerned. This mobilization of habits and inquiries is situated Mead, 1938) .
Both inquiries at
Arising in the interplay between habit, inquiry and the transformation of organizational or whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it" (Dewey 1922 (Dewey /2002 .
Situating the whole act within the flow of experience emphasizes both the relational and 23 temporal extensiveness of the ongoing experience that structures organizing actions (Simpson, 2014) . Evidently agency is in play in this process as choices are made about what and how adjustments are made, but in the Pragmatists' view, this agency is explicitly social rather than individualistic in its expression. It is a form of agency that arises in conversation, and as such, it pervades the social situation (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Simpson, 2009 ).
Mead ( In a conversational situation, this trans-actional approach implies that meaning-making cannot be attributed to any individual, but rather it emerges continuously from the very 24 processes of conversing (see also Bakhtin, 1981; Shotter, 2008; Tsoukas, 2009 ). Any act is always addressed by and addresses other acts, and its meaning depends upon the responses it evokes. Conversation can thus be understood as a continuous process of usually quite subtle, mutual re-orientations. Of course, we carry our habits with us into every conversation, and it is here that these dispositional attitudes are tested and adjusted to bring better, more practically useful understandings of the evolving situation. Ultimately it is selves, and their dispositions to act, that are transformed in conversation, so M only in relation to other selv (1925: 278).
The conversational trans-action is not only relational, but also temporal. In Mead's view (1932) , social agency engages both the past and the future as resources that give meaning and direction to actions in the present moment. As we proceed in our living and acting together, we rebuild both past experiences and anticipated futures to continuously re-author our understandings in response to what seems to be going on in the present moment (Simpson, 2014) . Presents then, are emergent turning points in the flow of living; they are events that arise whenever something happens. They are the creative confluence of two or more different temporalities. It is in the interweaving of pasts and futures that temporal experience is continuously constituted in the present moment (Hernes et al., 2013; Lorino and Mourey, 2013; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) . There is a close link between the conversational form of sociality and temporality (Roth, 2014) . The conversational trans-action is not the production of several participants, but the ongoing re-generation of differences. Conversant A moves the situation in a direction which makes it new for B; B responds to A by moving the situation in a direction that makes it new for A ... and so on. The present is fleshed out through this recurrent turntaking as successive turns lead to the gradual emergence of a mediate shape, a kind of discourse in acts (Lorino, 2014) . Just as music can never be fully appreciated as a mere sequence of sounds, it is the conversational flow that communicates the overall tone of coordinated action. Hypothetical accounts of the past, invisible expectations of the future, and the gradual emergence of sense in the dialogical dynamics of trans-action are thus temporally linked and interdependent. 
Discussion
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This chapter is motivated by a desire to explore what, if anything, a processual view of organizing might add to the currently flourishing literature on organizational routines, (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 94) . Looking through the lens of process philosophy and theory, we see four key obstacles to a more fluid understanding of how routines are created, maintained, disrupted, and changed. Firstly, we challenge the assumption that ostensive and performative aspects of routines can be united under a single theoretical umbrella. We agree with Latour (1986) that a more productive way forward could be to focus exclusively on developing routines theory within a performative idiom. Of course we acknowledge that this is the road less travelled, but for this very reason it is a path that offers great opportunity to adventurous researchers. Secondly, we point to implicit variance-based assumptions that relate the ostensive and the performative to each other through mutually causal mechanisms. There are two central tenets of variance-based theories that conflict with more processual approaches: (i) they assume the situation being examined is sufficiently stable that any timing differences amongst variables will have no material influence on outcomes; and (ii) they assume that all action is preceded by cognition. By contrast, process theories assume that the situations in which we find ourselves are continuously and endlessly unfolding, and within this flow, thinking and acting reside together as mutually constituting dynamics.
Thirdly, we observe that there is no explicit theorization of temporality in the routines literature. Of course the importance of time as an independent variable as routines unfold from their antecedents to their outcomes, is well recognized (Turner, 2014) , and there is also increasing scholarly interest in the temporal orientations of actors in routines (HowardGrenville, 2005) , but in these examples, and in the routines literature more generally, time 28 remains the abstract time of measuring, dating, and sequencing. It articulates the past as an already known and determined history, while the future is extrapolated from past experience.
However, this time-reckoning perspective cannot describe the temporality of the performative flow of living with its characteristics of emergence, unpredictability, and irreversibility. For example, how can we appreciate the temporality of an ordinary conversation that leads to new understandings, the temporality of wine-growers nursing their vineyard through uncertain weather, or the temporality of a football game with its many twists and turns? Whilst routines are undeniably present in each of these examples, they are situated within the flow of temporality rather than simply marching to the external rhythm of time. The inherently processual nature of the performative idiom demands a temporal understanding of the present moment as continuously emergent in the interplay between remembered pasts and imagined futures. Finally, distinctions such as micro-macro, but also individual-organizational, stimulus-response, and stability-change, may function as dualisms that arrest the flow of action, and reduce dynamic situations to static representational forms.
P practical mentalism, cognitivism or even intentionality in engaging with the day-to-day affairs of the (Chia and MacKay, 2007: 228) .
To move forward from these critiques, we have proposed an alternative theorization that resonates particularly with the performative idiom. Drawing on Pragmatist thinking, we have developed an argument that frames the social and temporal dimensions of ordinary everyday practice in terms of the mutually embedded and practically inseparable dynamics of habit, inquiry and conversational trans-action. We see the performativity of routines then, as provisionally constituted in the intelligent engagement of inquiry, understood as a 29 continuously emergent conversational process in which habitual predispositions to act in certain ways in certain situations are constantly exposed to the experimental logics of abduction, deduction and induction. The existential doubt that initiates an inquiry generates actions, out of which the problem and the solution co-emerge. This is a very different approach from the stimulus-response of March and Simon (1993) , where a routine is understood as being triggered by an already fully structured problem. It is holistic experience, rather than reflexes or cognitions, that allows us to connect particular types of situations to arrays of potential options for action. Further, because actors choose amongst their abducted emain stable, it may be radically disruptive and creative, or it may be anything in between. Actions then, are generative to the extent that different histories of experience may coincide to produce alternative anticipated futures. By positioning inquiry alongside conversational trans-action, our performative view of routines is fundamentally temporal as it locates actions in the perpetually unfolding present.
The Pragmatist approach we are advocating is concerned primarily with the flow of experience and processes of mutual transformation. As such, it is both ontologically processual, and epistemologically conversational and relational. These foundational assumptions invite new methodological approaches that engage with underlying processual dynamics, not only through historical analyses, but also by participating directly in the social and temporal present This requires us to step away from levels of analysis or other dualistic framings, and to immerse ourselves in the confluence of multiple, socially and temporally situated flows of action. It also invites us to carefully re-language the ways we talk about action in order to 30 avoid the stasis of representations and keep the dynamics alive in our analytical framings (Mesle, 2008) . W W (1979) entreaty to replace nouns with verbs in our research descriptions, the rush towards the gerund-ing of everything has perhaps now been overdone in the organizational literature. A more subtle relanguaging is called for. We suggest that the confluence of habits, inquiries and conversational trans-actions as defined by the Pragmatists offers just such a re-languaging of familiar ideas
in ways that open up new possibilities for analysis and research more generally.
In reviewing the routines literature, we are conscious that the field itself is in a state of dynamic emergence.
Step by step, the initial behaviorist account of routines has been deconstructed and replaced by an increased recognition that situated (performative) action is not the same as planned or programmed action. What we are proposing here is yet another step in this process, a step that is timely given recent developments in the field. At the conference that informed this edited volume, Martha Feldman (2014) proposed a new actionbased model of routines built on processes of patterning and performing . We see this as a very exciting move that sits remarkably comfortably with our Pragmatist argument, which allows us to understand patterning and performing, not as contrasting constructs, but as two mutually constituting flows within the same process, that of inquiry. We hope, therefore, that the Pragmatist take on habits, inquiry, and conversational trans-actions will resonate with further developments that advance the performative idiom in routines theory.
Ultimately, the real strength of the Pragmatist approach we have articulated is that it accounts for both the situatedness of actions in terms of the social and relational contexts in which they arise, and also for the continuous reconstruction of pasts and futures in the flow 31 of present experience. In doing so, it holds the potential for new theory that integrates the social and the temporal in a thorough-going performative exposition of the means by which the work of organizing is accomplished.
Note
1 Here we follow Bentley (1949/2008) in hyphenating this word to differentiate its meaning from other common usage, especially in economics and psychoanalysis. 
